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Title: Leading interagency planning and collaboration in mass gatherings: public 
health and safety in the 2012 London Olympics. 
 
Abstract 
Objectives Planning and implementing public health initiatives in mass gatherings 
such as the Olympic Games pose unique challenges for interorganizational 
collaboration which involves interaction among multiple and diverse agencies. 
Nonetheless, there is limited empirical evidence to support interagency collaboration 
and public health planning decisions in mass gatherings and how leadership can shape 
such interactions. We empirically explored these topics in the 2012 London Olympics 
to identify lessons to inform planning for future mass gatherings. 
Study design Qualitative case study. 
Methods Data comprised 39 semi-structured interviews with key informants 
conducted before, during and after the Games; in addition direct observations of field 
exercises and documentary analysis were also employed. Open coding and thematic 
analysis was used to analyze the data. 
Results We identified two main leadership challenges that influenced interagency 
collaboration: organizational public health leadership and coordinating collaborative 
decision making. Two facilitative conditions helped overcome the previous 
challenges: nurturing interorganizational linkages and creating shared understanding 
by activating codified frameworks at the organizational level. 
Conclusions Our study highlights leadership issues in interagency collaboration in 
mass gatherings. Practical implications arising from this study may inform the ways 
organizers of mass gatherings, public health and safety agencies and professionals can 
engage in effective partnerships and joint working. 
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Introduction 
Mass gatherings are an increasingly common feature of our interconnected 
global world. They often bring together organizations that do not normally interact 
and the large number of attendees and stakeholders involved represent an enormous 
planning and logistical challenge. Such events usually represent significant challenges 
for the public health and safety sector of the host countries.1,2  The distinctive features 
of these events that can affect public health and safety services include their wide 
geographical spread, large levels of attendance, event duration and the security 
concerns they present.3 The goal for public health and safety during mass gatherings 
is to prevent or minimize the risk of injuries or illnesses and maximize the safety for 
participants, spectators, staff and residents.4 
 
 Major areas of public health responsibility involve the provision of health 
services to spectators and participants, mass-casualty preparedness, disease 
surveillance and outbreak response, environmental health protection, public 
information, health promotion and preparedness for possible chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear (CBRN) incidents.2 During mass gatherings, potential public 
health risks include communicable diseases, heat- or cold-related illnesses, foodborne 
and waterborne illness and mass-casualty incidents.5 Host countries have to 
strengthen their public health systems to be able to deal with a variety of potential 
health problems and emergencies. Therefore, public health planning for such events 
requires the collaboration between local, regional, voluntary and national health-
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related services as well as with the official coordinating agency or organizer, for 
example, the London Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games (LOCOG).6-10  
 
Research identified interagency collaboration being crucial to the planning and 
delivery of public health services in mass gatherings.7,11 In mass gatherings the 
diversity of stakeholders involved often have different objectives and sometimes 
conflicting interests, which may negatively impact interagency collaboration.12 
However, research to date has not yet looked explicitly at how this collaboration 
unfolds in practice and in the field of public health, while extant studies focus on 
investigating emergency department hospital admissions, health surveillance systems 
and infectious disease outbreaks.5,7,8,13 We focus on the Olympic Games as an 
exemplar case of a large international mass gathering. We explored leadership issues 
in interagency collaboration for public health, safety and security preparedness in the 
London 2012 Olympic Games.  
 
Methods 
Study Design 
A qualitative single case study design with multiple data sources was used.14 
This methodology allowed us to ‘focus on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-
life context’.15 A single case study approach is appropriate when it represents an 
exemplar case as was our empirical study of the 2012 London Olympics.16-18 
Olympics are a typical case of a mass gathering because they are characterized by 
large numbers of spectators, athletes, mass-media, in a limited geographical area over 
a short period of time.19 The research took place in three stages: a) during the 
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preparations for the Games, b) during the actual Games and c) after the completion of 
the Games. 
 
Setting and Selection of Participants 
The study population consisted of public health and safety professionals in 
London who had a key role in London Olympics to safeguard public’s health, safety 
and security. We employed purposive sampling covering diverse types of senior 
roles.20 The sample size was 26 professionals (Table 1) who belonged to “Category 1 
and 2 Organizations” which, according to the UK legislation, have duties in 
safeguarding public health, safety and security in the event of an emergency.21 
Category 1 responders are known as core responders and they include the following 
services: a. emergencies services (police, fire, ambulance, coastguard), b. local 
authorities, c. health bodies, d. government agencies (environment agency). Category 
2 responders act in support of Category 1 responders and they are mostly utilities 
services, voluntary and transport organizations. We also included the Military service 
which according to a function called ‘Military Aid to the Civil Authorities’ has the 
duty to support Category 1 responders.22 
 
Table 1. Participants’ characteristics 
# Interviewee Gender Organization Category 
1 or 2 
Position 
1 Adam M National Health 
Service (NHS) 
1 Emergency 
Preparedness 
2 Jack M London Fire Brigade 
(LFB) 
1 Olympics Project 
Team Manager 
3 Pat M London Ambulance 
Service (LAS) 
1 Olympic Planning 
4 Tonia F Health Protection 
Agency (HPA) 
1 Olympics Program 
Manager 
5 Lyn F NHS 1 Olympics Deputy 
Program Director 
6 Sal M LAS 1 Liaison Officer 
7 Cal M Metropolitan Police 
Service (MPS) 
1 Olympics Program 
Management 
8 Jacob M LAS 1 Contingency 
Planning and 
Resilience Manager 
9 Randy M Greater London 
Authority (GLA) 
1 Games Operations 
Resilience 
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10 Eleanor F HPA 1 Olympic 
Surveillance Work 
Stream 
11 Barry M MPS 1 Olympics Project 
Manager 
12 Paul M MPS 1 Olympics 
Operational Planning 
13 James M MPS 1 Olympics Strategic 
Briefing Cell 
14 Georgia F NHS 1 Specialist Advisor 
15 Sam M MPS 1 Specialist Operations 
16 Neal M MPS 1 Counter-terrorism 
Security Coordinator 
17 Noel M TRANSPORT 2 Contingency 
Planning Manager 
18 Jason M LFB 1 Deputy Head of 
Emergency Planning 
19 Malcolm M MPS 1 Chief Inspector 
Emergency Planning 
20 Ben M MILITARY 1 Olympics Lead 
Planner 
21 Samuel M British Red Cross 
(BRC) 
2 Emergency Planning 
22 Maggie F BRC 2 Olympics Program 
Manager 
23 Ralf M MARITIME 1 Security and 
Olympics Projects 
24 Berry M BRC 2 Emergency Planning 
Officer 
25 Jeff M ENVIRONMENT 
AGENCY 
1 Contingency 
Planning Team 
26 Marley M MPS 1 Emergency 
Preparedness 
Inspector 
 
Data Collection 
The study was conducted from May 2011, 14 months before the actual Games, 
until October 2012, two months after the completion of the Games. Data were 
collected through: semi-structured interviews, direct observations and documentary 
analysis. The use of multiple sources of data increased the validity of the study as ‘no 
single source has a complete advantage over all the others’.15 First, 26 semi-structured 
in-depth interviews were conducted, from May 2011 until February 2012 and 13 
participants provided a second interview after the Games. The interviews occurred in 
6 
 
a place mutually agreed by both the researcher and the participant. They were 
digitally recorded and fieldnotes were also kept to capture researcher’s insights. The 
average duration of the interviews was 50 minutes.  
 
Second, unstructured naturalistic observations of operation rooms, meetings 
and interagency exercises were conducted to record interagency leadership activities, 
which supported the interview data and helped to provide an integrated overview of 
the context. Observations allowed us to examine the phenomenon of collaboration as 
it naturally occurred.23 They were carried out between May 2011 and August 2012 in 
two phases: during the preparations for the Games and during the actual Games. They 
included observations of four exercises and six meetings during the preparations and 
of four Special Operation Rooms during the actual Games resulting in 94 hours of 
field observation. Finally, a range of documents produced by the agencies such as 
reports, agendas, minutes from meetings, strategic and procedures manuals were used 
and analyzed as secondary sources of evidence to complement evidence from other 
sources.24  
 
Data Analysis 
All interviews were transcribed verbatim and then the transcribed interview 
word files were imported into NVivo 7 qualitative data analysis Software (QSR 
International). Transcriptions of interviews, observations’ fieldnotes and documents 
were coded using thematic analysis.25 Analysis was open-ended by which we aimed 
to identify issues as they emerged. After completing the coding phase, we discussed 
each code separately to better understand their meaning. We also compared the 
different codes to identify relationships between the categories. The final four 
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leadership issues were decided through discussion with the whole research team, 
focusing on findings that were useful for future planners. Trustworthiness was assured 
through the methods of audit trail, triangulation, member check and peer review of 
data analysis.23 More specifically, constant dialogues within the research team during 
both the formation and development of the codes helped us to reflect on the data and 
think various alternatives of interpretations. In addition, transcripts were returned to 
participants for verification.  
 
Results 
We identified two leadership challenges that organizations faced during their 
collaboration before and during the Games: organizational public health leadership 
and coordinating collaborative decision making. Nurturing interorganizational 
linkages and creating shared understanding by activating codified frameworks at the 
organizational level helped overcome the previous challenges and enabled 
collaborative working. These four themes represent those areas participants identified 
as crucial to influencing interagency collaboration. These leadership challenges and 
strategies are discussed below in detail accompanied by exemplar data quotations.  
 
Organizational public health leadership 
Usually, the organizer of a mass gathering has the primacy of the event and is 
legally responsible for all the actions taken in order to have a successful event. 
Similarly, professionals and agencies expected that LOCOG, the agency with the 
legal duty for organizing and delivering the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, 
would be leading the delivery of the event, including the public health and safety 
aspects. However, LOCOG did not fulfill the participants’ expectations, especially 
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during the planning phase of the Games, regarding their leadership roles. Participants 
acknowledged that being highly-fractured meant that the public health and safety 
issue was only one functional area for the organization and not one of their priorities. 
More specifically, LOCOG’s organizational nature being a nascent, transient, 
fractured and dynamically growing organization was attributed by participants to help 
explain this lack of engagement: 
“I think LOCOG probably will be the challenge here because they are outside 
the clique, and then there's suddenly this new organization that’s growing and 
growing. So, internally you speak to one person and you speak to another 
person and they don't know each other” (Jacob, LAS). 
 
It was widely reported by the participants that LOCOG did not recognize early 
the necessity of working with other partners in regard to planning for the issue of 
public health and safety. They seemed to be inward looking, focused on their 
organization and working in isolation rather than being part of a collective, multi-
agency environment: 
“I think they could have done more to engage properly with establishments 
that are already here” (Adam, NHS). 
Therefore, agencies had to put pressure on them and persuade them in order to start 
working together and integrate their processes and plans. Participants highlighted that 
LOCOG’s plans, as the leading organization, regarding how they would respond in a 
public health and safety issue, would influence the responses of the other agencies and 
they needed to link their plans in order to provide a coordinated response.  
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Coordinating collaborative decision making 
LOCOG’s lack of leadership appeared to increase role ambiguity between the 
agencies and it was widely reported by the participants in this study that it was a great 
challenge to know the exact decision-making process. Unclear responsibilities and 
fluid participation in decision making seemed to create uncertainty which hindered 
interorganizational understanding and collaboration. For example, during an 
interagency exercise that took place five months before the Games and whose aim 
was to test the interagency response to emergency incidents through Games-focused 
scenarios, in one of the four scenarios, it became apparent that participants did not 
know whose responsibility it was to divert the torch relay in case of a fire in the area: 
“If the smoke problem is approaching the torch relay (…) I at the moment, 
and this is a worry to me, I don’t know who needs to know that and who’s the 
decision maker about moving the torch relay, I don’t know who has the final 
call on whether to move in, whether to cancel it” (Jeff, Environment Agency). 
 
Similarly, during a national multi-agency exercise that occurred in September 
2011, the majority of the participants reported that it was not clear which organization 
navigated the decision-making process across agencies. In fact, one of the key 
recommendations of the exercise was that the team responsible for planning the 
exercises should shift their emphasis towards leadership issues. It was suggested that 
only by exercising and defining the exact decision-making procedure, professionals’ 
assumptions would be limited and preparedness would be maximized. The following 
quote reflects the general sentiment shared by the participants before the Games about 
the issues of accountability and decision-making roles:  
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“But who will take responsibility for what, mmm, I’m not entirely sure like 
who would make the definite decision like you need to close this or that venue 
for instance (…)” (Eleanor, Health Protection Agency). 
 
Nurturing interorganizational linkages 
Participants stressed the importance of breaking down the barriers of 
organizational boundaries by creating interorganizational linkages. Two kinds of 
linkages proved to be valuable for interagency collaboration: formal linkages with 
formal roles such as boundary-spanners and informal links including acquaintances or 
ex colleagues. For example, approximately six months before the Games LOCOG 
employed one professional from the Local Authorities who was well-known to all the 
emergency services in London. This link was perceived to improve LOCOG’s 
understanding about the other agencies’ roles and clarify the expectations that 
organizations had from LOCOG as a leading agency. According to many respondents, 
LOCOG recognized the positive outcomes of having such linkages with the other 
agencies and proceeded to employ a number of police-officers who were near 
retirement and had experience in managing mass gatherings. These linkages were 
considered to encourage LOCOG to work in partnership with other organizations and 
improve the relationships between them. In addition, they managed to promote the 
importance of the public health and safety issue and the necessity of clarifying the 
responsibilities of each agency on the issue: 
“They have taken I think about a half-dozen including our first silver 
commander that we had, who's retired and gone with the LOCOG [...] if it's 
controlled I think it's a good thing because our people understand how we 
work” (Barry, MPS). 
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Apart from LOCOG’s effort to engage more with the other agencies, some of 
the London’s emergency services initiated early in the planning stage a close 
collaboration with LOCOG. For example, the London Fire Brigade managed to have 
one professional from their staff working full-time in this organization in order to 
build the relationship, enable the information sharing flow and improve the 
understanding of the LOCOG’s processes about the public health and safety issue. 
This action was initiated by a number of individuals (specifically operational leaders) 
from the organizations who approached LOCOG, explained to them the benefits of 
having such linkages and since there was not any financial burden, they agreed to 
have such links. Interorganizational linkages not only enabled organizations to build 
relationships with LOCOG but also facilitated the development of integrated plans.  
 
Creating shared understanding by activating codified frameworks 
Codified frameworks including guidance books and written agreements played 
an important role in overcoming the two previous leadership challenges. 
Documentary data and more specifically the National Operational Guidance 
document, whose aim was to support the fire and rescue service in delivering safe 
incident command during emergencies, suggested that codified procedures that were 
shared among different agencies made roles and responsibilities among the 
organizations more explicit and enabled the decision-making process by building a 
shared understanding. For example, in the UK, there is the Green Guide26 and the 
Purple Guide27 which are UK government-funded guidance books on spectator safety 
at sports grounds. According to many respondents, the existence and the use of such 
documents enabled the identification of the professionals and services that were 
accountable for making decisions and therefore facilitated interagency collaboration: 
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“So, if you, for example, fall over in a venue and, and break a leg, LOCOG 
medical services will deal with you and we will send an ambulance to take you 
to the hospital, because venues are controlled by two police’s guidance, the 
green guide and the purple guide. So, those principles are being applied to 
LOCOG venues and that’s how it works” (Sal, Ambulance Service). 
 
In addition, in a number of observations during the Games, it was evident that 
agencies utilized written agreements in order to clarify the role of each agency in 
several situations and who would be accountable for the final decisions. For example, 
during an observation at the HPA’s Headquarters Coordination Centre one day during 
the Games, the agency produced a daily document called ‘HPA Update’ which 
included the working agreements between the HPA and LOCOG. It also clarified that 
in the event of a significant public health incident, HPA staff would work with 
LOCOG to respond to the incident and provide information. The professionals 
working in that room perceived this document as a great advantage for collaboration 
as it identified the role of each agency in case of an incident. 
 
Discussion 
Collaboration between diverse organizations is a critical factor during mass 
gatherings.6-11 We sought to identify the key components of the collaborative 
organizing of public health and safety agencies in the 2012 London Olympic Games. 
Consistent with the literature, leadership was identified as an important element of 
interagency collaboration in the Olympic Games.7,11 Also early engagement of the 
organizers is vital for the success of public health interventions.7,11,28-30 However, in 
our study, the involvement of LOCOG in working together with other organizations 
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during the seven years of the planning stage was perceived to be weak. Participants 
suggested a number of reasons that explained this lack of commitment e.g. the nascent 
and transient nature of the organization and the low prioritization of the public health 
and safety issue. The delay of LOCOG’s collaborative activities resulted in an 
inadequate level of preparedness as the integrated plans were developed very late. 
This is consistent with literature since health organizations had difficulties in working 
with LOCOG because of its position of being a private provider with its own policies, 
procedures and priorities.31  
 
Another leadership challenge that also influenced interagency collaboration 
included the inexplicit decision-making process across agencies. The interviewees 
indicated that the importance of delineating and codifying the leadership roles and 
responsibilities of various agencies during the planning phase was overlooked by the 
leading agencies. The literature has also recognized the importance of clear 
accountability and command structure among the agencies in their collaboration.6,32 
Decision making among the agencies is an important issue that has not been explicitly 
discussed in the literature.7 According to our study, one of the difficulties associated 
with the above lack of clarity was the unclear distribution of information among the 
organizations and which organization was leading the decision making strategically. 
  
We found that the use of linkages between LOCOG and other organizations 
was a mechanism that appeared to break down the barriers between the two parties, 
improved LOCOG’s understanding about the other agencies’ roles and clarified the 
expectations that organizations had from LOCOG as a leading agency. This 
mechanism was considered to be more fundamental for interagency collaboration than 
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it was perceived by the literature. Only one author has suggested that joint staffing 
among organizations positively influences the development of interagency 
collaboration.33 These liaison roles managed to create shared meanings among 
organizations while maintaining interoperable communication systems among them.  
 
We found that codification was a significant mechanism that aided 
organizations to overcome many challenges. Explicit codified knowledge allowed 
professionals to understand external (to their organization) knowledge, facilitated the 
decision-making process by building a shared understanding and enabled them to 
adapt to the interagency environment of the Games. The use of united codified 
principles and procedures among different agencies made the roles and 
responsibilities of the leading organizations more explicit and facilitated interagency 
collaboration.  
 
We used established approaches to enhance the validity of our findings.24, 34-36 
Nonetheless, our study has limitations which need to be recognized. First, the time 
constraints that did not allow the conduct of a preliminary analysis while collecting 
the data and the fact that half of the participants did not give a second interview can 
have an influence on the quality of the findings. Also, even though we managed to 
reach out the key actors involved in the public health and safety aspect of the Games, 
we did not include representatives from LOCOG. Their view probably could have 
provided another aspect on the issue of collaboration and contribute to a broader 
understanding of the phenomenon under study. In addition, even though the London 
Olympics had a wider geographical remit than just London itself, the study population 
comprised professionals based in London. The research setting is another limitation 
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since we capture the perspectives and experiences of professionals coming from a 
variety of public health and safety organizations in the specific setting of the 2012 
London Olympic Games. The Olympic Games represent a typical mass gathering but 
other types of mass events also exist such as the World Cup and religious festivals. 
Hence, to fully comprehend the issue of interagency collaboration in mass gatherings, 
an exploration of other settings is required. Studying the unique setting of the London 
Olympics limits the transferability of the findings, and hence, the data should be 
transmitted with great caution to other organizations. 
 
In conclusion, this study extends our understanding of how leadership shapes 
interagency collaboration in the context of a mass gathering and enables us to 
generate a novel understanding of leadership elements that can be used to understand 
collaboration in complex environments. Our study suggests that leadership plays a 
strong role in interagency collaboration in mass gatherings and by examining its role, 
the phenomenon of collaboration can be much more clearly conceptualized. 
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